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Comments
THE "SECONDARY BOYCOTT PROVISION"
OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The apparent strength at the polls of organized labor in the
recent national elections' has insured at least a reconsideration
of the controversial Taft-Hartley Act 2 by the Eighty-First Con-
gress. A certain target for repeal or modification will be the
act's so-called "secondary boycott provision," which presents in
essence an attempt to place limits to the legitimate area of eco-
nomic conflict between labor and management. 4 How has the
Taft-Hartley Act affected this perplexing problem, with its broad
social, economic and political ramifications?
No area of labor law has been characterized by more con-
fusion than that of the secondary boycott.5 However, the cases
have been rather consistent in declaring illegal definite coercive
pressure applied to one person or business as a means ultimately
of influencing the action of another person or business.6 On the
whole the courts, applying common law principles, have suc-
1. See Time Magazine, Nov. 15, 1948, p. 25, col. 2: a total of 121 senators
and representatives who voted for the Taft-Hartley Act were either beaten
in the primaries, retired, died, or were eliminated in the general elections.
2. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. For an excellent discussion of the act
see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (1948)
61 Harvard L. Rev. 1, 274.
3. Section 8(b): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation or its agents-. ... (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities
or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or re-
quiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, hand-
ling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person; .... " (Italics supplied.)
4. The necessity for restricting this area of conflict was stressed in Car-
penters and Joiners' Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143 (1942). A correlative problem treated
there, namely the relation between stranger picketing and free speech, is
not within the scope of this comment.
5. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see Gregory, Labor and the
Law (1946) 444; Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disputes-The
Secondary Boycott (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 277; Barnard and Graham,
Labor and the Secondary Boycott (1940) 15 Wash. L. Rev. 137.
6. Traditional definition of a secondary boycott may be found in Duplex




ceeded very well in distinguishing between conduct primarily de-
fensive but causing incidental injury to third persons and conduct
aimed at compelling the assistance of neutrals. For example, the
refusal of union men to work on the same job with non-union men,7
or to handle or work upon non-union made products,8 or to handle
work for customers of their disputing employer 9 has been recog-
nized as defensive conduct despite incidental injury to third per-
sons. A similar view has been taken of the sending of "unfair"
lists by a union to its associates in organized labor.10 On the
other hand, a refusal of union labor to work on a union job for
a subcontractor because the principal contractor had another job
where non-union men were employed," picketing the place of
business of a person because the contractor engaged by him to
construct a building not connected with that business employed
non-union labor, 2 general picketing of a retailer who stocked
a non-union product, or putting him on an "unfair" list 3 have
been found illegal as designed to compel the assistance of neu-
trals.
There has also been a constriction of the category of neutrals
so as to bring within the area of conflict and thus justify direct
7. Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988 (1910); Cohn Co. v. Brick-
layers' Local, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659 (1917); Jetton-Dekle Lbr. Co. v.
Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907); Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul
Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 520, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N.W.
1055 (1917); National Protective Ass'n of Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cum-
mins, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
8. Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663 (1903); Cres-
cent Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, 234 Mo. App. 1243, 123 S.W. (2d) 193 (1939);
State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
9. Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908),
where the court concluded that if the complainant had the right to seek the
aid of fellow manufacturers in getting the necessary amount of labor put
into his product, the union had a correlative right to prevent that end.
10. Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. I.B.E.W., 226 Iowa 191, 284 N.W. 126 (1939);
Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127(1908); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
11. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of America
v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931). See Pickett v. Walsh,
192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906).
12. Carpenters & Joiners' Union v. Ritters' Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct.
807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942), where the court did not find an interdependence
of economic interest between a restaurant and a construction job in another
part of town.
13. Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N.E. 928 (1908); Evening Times Print-
ing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 122 N.J. Eq. 545, 195
Atl. 378 (1937); Mitnick v. Furniture Workers' Union Local No. 66, C.I.O. of
City of Newark, 200 Atl. 553 (N.J. Ch. 1938); People v. McFarlin, 43 Misc.
591, 89 N.Y. Supp. 527 (1904); B. Gertz Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 871 (Sup. Ct. 1937); A.F. of L. v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 33 App.
D.C. 83, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748 (1909). Cf. Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y.
281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937); Wagner v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 320 Ill.
App. 341, 50 N.E. (2d) 865 (1943); Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Em-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. IX
coercive practices against those having a unity of interest or
economic nexus with a disputing employer, such as those to
whom the disputing employer shifts his work 14 or whom he uses
as a medium of distribution. 5 At the moment it is difficult to say
how far an "interdependence of economic interest of all engaged
in the same industry" may legally justify a focusing of direct
attack on others than the immediate employer. Later cases dis-
play a tendency on the part of the courts to look more to eco-
nomic factors and to consider carefully the relations of a third
party to the disputing employer. 6 The pertinent question now
is, has this trend been reversed by the secondary boycott provi-
sion" of the Taft-Hartley Act?
An examination of the language of Section 8(b) (4) (A) will
reveal that the confusion which characterized the common law
treatment of secondary boycotts has not been eliminated by this
provision. A perusal of congressional debates and reports fails
to show just how far that law-making body intended to go in
curbing the use of economic pressure by unions by making un-
lawful a concerted refusal to use, handle or work on goods or
products of a disputing employer. The section makes such con-
duct unlawful "where an object thereof is" forcing or requiring
any person to cease his business relationships with another. The
ultimate scope of the provision hinges upon the interpretation
ployees Union, 195 So. 791 (La. App. 1940); Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v.
Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 AtI. (2d) 152 (1941).
14. Iron Molders'. Union v. Allis-Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908).
15. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S.
91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63 (1940); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1941).
1 16. This approach is demonstrated in several recent cases. In Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct.
122, 85 L.Ed. 63 (1940), the union was picketing retail stores that sold milk
processed by plaintiff dairies and distributed by a vendor system which
threatened defendant union's wage scale. The court, warning against "shut-
ting one's eyes to the everyday elements of industrial strife," refused to
Issue an injunction. Third parties were also deemed to be within the legiti-
mate area of conflict in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers v. Wohl, 315
U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1941), where the defendant union, seek-
ing to force bread peddlers to maintain a six day week and employ a union
man for one of those days, picketed a bakery which supplied the peddlers.
Economic ties binding the bakery to the peddlers were found to be so close
as to justify the union's bringing the bakery within the scope of its attack
upon the peddlers in order to force the latter to terms.
A contrary result was reached in Carpenters & Joiners' Union v. Rit-
ter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143 (1942), cited supra note 12.
Although labor's right to compete with management for public favor was
given full recognition, the court was unwilling to condone direct coercion of
a third party because the contractor he employed to construct a building
wholly unrelated to his cafe business used non-union labor on that building.
In other words, as distinguished from the Wohl and Lake Valley Farm Pro-
ducts cases, the third party here was found to be in reality a "neutral."
COMMENTS
of the phrase "where an object thereof is." These words were
substituted for the words "for the purpose of" which appeared
in the original senate version.1'7 Opponents of the provision con-
tended that this language was so broad that it represented an
indiscriminate attack on all forms of peaceful action by labor
unions regardless of its objective.' 8 Senator Taft expressed the
opinion that it "merely reversed the effect of the law as to sec-
ondary boycotts"' 9 and seemed to place special emphasis upon
the injustice of situations analogous to that in the Allen-Bradley
case.20 In his analysis of the changes made in the senate version
by the conference report,21 the senator did not mention the change
made in Section 8 (b) (4) from "for the purpose of" to "where an
object thereof is."'22
A question that immediately arises is whether the change
was designed to render illegal any cooperative action involving
a refusal to use, handle or work upon non-union made goods. It
suggests that the drafters had in mind outlawing conduct pri-
marily defensive as long as it might be determined that "an
object thereof" was to interfere with the freedom of choice of a
third party. Obviously enough, labor knows that a refusal to
handle non-union products in the hands of a third party may
operate not only as a defensive measure but may have also the
affirmative effect of "forcing or requiring" the user to cease his
using. Must this knowledge require a holding that "an object"
of such refusal is to force or require the foreseen results? If the
court had to find that this foreseen result was "the purpose" of
such refusal it might be led to conclude that "the purpose" meant
"the primary purpose" which was self protection. But, does the
changed language require it to find that coercion was "an object"
of the refusal? It should be noticed that by so holding, union
labor would be "forced and required" to cut its own throat by
using, handling and working upon non-union made products,
thus giving support to the employer with whom it is in dispute.
17. 93 Cong. Rec. 4197 (1947).
18. See Senator Murray's "Analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act," 93 Cong.
Rec. 6503 (1947).
19. 93 Cong. Rec. 4198 (1947).
20. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533,
89 L.Ed. 1939 (1945), where a local union which controlled all employment
in the manufacture and installation of electrical equipment in the New York
City area would allow no outside manufactured equipment to be sold in the
New York City market. This embargo was placed on union-made and non-
union made equipment alike.
21. 93 Cong. Rec. 6534 (1947).
22. Id. at 6441, 6443.
19491
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A resume of the cases that have dealt with the "secondary
boycott provision" will show that its exact extent of operation
is still not at all clear. Injunctive relief has been granted under
Section 10(1)23 in several cases where there was refusal to per-
form services, or action inducing such refusal, and where the tri-
bunal found "an object" was to force the immediate employer to
cease doing business with some other person with whom the
union had the primary dispute.24 At the same time, relief has
been refused when the struck employer was "firmly allied" to
the disputing employer.25 Language in one of the cases seems
to indicate that attention will continue to focus upon the ques-
tion of whether or not non-disputants are being coerced.26 How-
ever, none of these decisions as yet has dwelt upon the subject
of labor's privilege to refrain from doing anything that may be
injurious to its cause, even though such "negative" action may
interfere with a third party's freedom of choice as an incidental
result. One case presented an opportunity to discuss the point,
but no mention of it is found in the opinion. 27 There had been
a work stoppage by union members at Jardine Liquor Corpora-
tion in New York City and the employer charged that one pur-
pose of the strike was to exert pressure on Schenley Distillers
Corporation to get it to agree to contract terms at its plant in
Kentucky with another local of the same union. Jardine Cor-
poration customarily handled Schenley products, and the union
23. This section makes it mandatory on the N.L.R.B. to petition for
an injunction when there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
Section 8(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C) exists.
24. Le Baron v. Printing Specialists Union, 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. No. 64,290
(D.C. Cal. 1948), where picketing caused employees of transportation com-
panies to cease handling hot cargo; Sperry v. United Brotherhood of Car-
penters, 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. No. 64,249 (D.C. Kans. 1948), where the union
prevented its members from working for contractor who erected prefabri-
cated houses built by manufacturer with whom wage dispute existed; Dixie
Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated Assn., 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. No. 64,231
(D.C. Ark. 1947).
25. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas.
No. 64,271 (D.C. N.Y. 1948). For several years the Project Engineering Com-
pany had served as subcontractor for Ebasco Services. After the union
started striking against Ebasco, the amount of work subcontracted to Pro-
ject Company was increased so that it accounted for about 75% of the lat-
ter's business. Refusing to enjoin defendant union's strike against Project
Company, the Board found that Section 8(b) (4) (A) was intended to protect
only "neutrals" and "bystanders" who were wholly unconcerned with the
disagreement between employer and employee. Thus, the meaning of "any
other person" was restricted so as to exclude those to whom the disputing
employer shifted his work.
26. Le Baron v. Printing Specialists Union, 14 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. No. 64,290
(D.C. Cal. 1948), in which the decision was to the effect that "only coercive
and compulsive conduct" was proscribed.
27. Douds v. Wine, Liquor, and Distillery Workers Union, 13 C.C.H. Lab.
Cas No. 64,186 (D.C. N.Y. 1947).
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allegedly insisted that its members should not move them until
the contract controversy was settled. The board found a viola-
tion of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), ruling that such violation existed
if only one of the objects of the work stoppage was the purpose
forbidden by law.28
In the absence of any definitive delineation of the scope
of this provision, speculation as to its proper application is
both permissible and appropriate. Suppose the members of a
carpenters' union refuse to work for the subcontractor on a cer-
tain building because the principal contractor runs an office
where he employs only non-union clerks. The finding that "an
object" 29 of this conduct was to force the subcontractor to cease
dealing with the principal contractor until the latter employed
union clerks would without doubt seem to be a proper effectua-
tion of the purpose of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). On the other hand,
suppose the workers in a furniture factory refuse to handle
lumber shipped from a mill employing only non-union labor.
Must it be concluded that "an object" of this conduct is to force
the owner of the furniture factory to cease dealing with the lum-
ber mill proprietor since it would likely have such result? Or,
is this conduct so necessary to the protection of union interests
that its coercive effect may be treated as a merely incidental re-
sult of the one "object"-that is, a refusal to aid actively interests
in conflict with its own? There would seem to be a very sub-
stantial basis for the contention that the necessity for recogniz-
ing a privilege in labor to withhold its services where they would
lend assistance to the opposing party is sufficiently great to jus-
tify holding that where its conduct is primarily self defensive,
and there is no affirmative showing of an attempt to coerce or
require any action by a third party, it was not the purpose of
Congress to deny such privilege by the use of the ambiguous
language found in this section.
Modification of the "secondary boycott provision" to some
extent is a foregone conclusion. Those who opposed the present
28. The union had argued that the purpose of the stoppage was to speed
up settlement of certain grievances by Jardine Corporation. The board de-
clared that this point was irrelevant as long as one purpose was to exert
pressure on the manufacturer who supplied the goods which employees re-
fused to handle. One may speculate here as to what position the board
would have taken if the union had contended, instead, that this was merely
defensive conduct (i.e., a refusal to aid actively an employer who was openly
opposing union interests).
29. Webster's Dictionary (2d ed., unabridged) defines "object" as "that
.on which the purposes are fixed as the end of action or effort; that which
is sought for; end; aim; motive; final cause."
1949]
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version seemed to favor a provision which would define certain
lawful objectives of unions and permit either defensive or affirm-
atively coercive conduct against neutrals in support thereof.8 0
Thus, if the object of the particular conduct were found to be
legitimate under the terms of the section, labor would be given
a virtual carte blanche to coerce the aid of neutrals anywhere
along the line in its effort to achieve that object .3 Would labor
be justified in asking for so much? It may have just cause to
complain that it should not be forced to give indirect aid to the
opposing party even if this causes incidental injury to neutrals,
but can it justly ask for direct conscriptive power?3 2 Would the
best interests of the people as a whole be served by the conclu-
sion that it is essential to the adequate protection and advance-
ment of legitimate union interests to allow union labor to force
a neutral to take its side in the struggle? The future of our sys-
tem of free enterprise may well hinge upon the answer given to
these questions by those who render the ultimate decision.
FRED W. JONES
30. See H. R. Doc. No. 334, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 5; Sen. Rep. No.
105, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 19, 20, which notes the president's
observation in his "veto message" to the effect that all secondary boycotts
are not unjustified, but must be judged on the basis of their objectives.
See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) § 145, for
a possible hint as to what "lawful objects" may be. .
31. Suppose the workers at a rendering plant strike for higher wages.
Should we, then, permit a strike against a soap manufacturer purchasing
from the rendering plant, a wholesaler distributing the manufacturer's soap,
a retailer selling the soap, an individual using the soap, a laundry using the
soap, a paper company supplying soap wrappers to the manufacturer, a
magazine carrying soap ads, an independent hauler hauling dead animals
for the rendering plant, or a shoe manufacturer buying hides from the plant?
32. The Supreme Court has attempted to deal with this matter by defin-
Ing the term "neutral" so as to exclude those having an interdependence of
economic interest in the same industry. This is basically the difference be-
tween cases such as Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Products,
311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63 (1940), and Bakery & Pastry Drivers
& Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1941), on the one
hand and Carpenters & Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct.
807, 86 L.Ed. 1143 (1942). See note 16, supra.
